The 3-1-6 attacking formation
The 3-2-5/2-3-5 attacking formation became an integral facet of modern-day positional play with a front five spreading across the zones to create spaces for passes and switch balls to the opposite flank. However, teams like Erik ten Hag’s Ajax, Marco Rose’s Borussia Monchengladbach, Julian Nagelsmann’s RB Leipzig and Mikel Arteta’s Arsenal are utilising the 3-1-6 attacking formation. With the continued development of attacking fullbacks, ball-playing centre-backs and the well-rehearsed uniformity of opposition defensive blocks, a staggered front six has become more integral at creating goalscoring opportunities. Years ago, Thomas Tuchel imposed his 3-1-2-4 formation at Borussia Dortmund to great effect with Julian Weigl, Ousmane Dembele and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang thriving as coaches have taken this ideal to another level.
Build-up
The 3-1-6 build-up shape includes a singular pivote with a three-chain, usually a midfielder will move in between or next to the centre-back unless the team in possession are utilising an established back three. The formation can also seem like a 1+3 build-up shape as the two wider centre-backs push into the midfield line next to the six space to provide better passing angles to the fullbacks or one of the four players dropping deep to receive the ball in the central lines. The full-backs are pushed high as the midfielder drops into the three-chain but remain deeper than the central front four to act as passing options if the passing options in the centre are blocked.
The situation above is Erik Ten Hag’s Ajax who are utilising the 3-1-6 shape against Valencia’s 4-4-2 medium block as this particular attacking shape has proven effective at creating issues in 4-4-2 defensive blocks. The first facet of this shape is that it creates a 3v2 with the first line of the opposition press as the back three can circulate the ball amongst each other, creating passing lanes to the six space by moving the line of pressure while the six moves from side to side and using their numerical superiority in the first line to progress play. Ajax are one of the better sides in Europe at creating passing angles to the six space out of 3+1 situations as they will normally utilise a double pivot before one of the midfielders drops into a wide centre-back role, drawing a marker and an inch of space for a pass from the most central defender to the six space.
When teams look to dominate the game and create more goalscoring opportunities, they normally respond by creating numerical superiorities in between the lines as this attacking formation has an onus on establishing these issues for the opposition low block while creating direct passing angles into the pockets. When the ball is moved to the six space, this creates a dilemma for the opposition defensive block as if an attacker drops to try and regain possession, the midfielder will work a pass back into the three-chain who will not only maintain numerical superiority but spacial superiority as the centre-backs can now drive the ball to draw a marker and release the ball to the fullback or in between the lines. The middle four in between the lines prevents the opposition from pushing up to press as if they press with a solitary marker, this opens a passing lane to the player in between the lines.
In the Ajax situation, the opposition respond by pushing a solitary player up to press the six space as their winger has to decide whether he should move into a more central position to cover the passing lane or continue to support his fullback in the wide areas. The Ajax midfielder is in a situation where the midfielder has moved up to mark him and the striker has dropped deep to close down his passing options. He can release the ball to the most central centre-back who can push up and play a pass to the right centre-back to drive into space and have a direct passing lane to the players in between the lines or to the 3v2/4v2 situation that Ajax can establish in the wide areas. He can also pass back to the centre-back to work a pass to the left centre-back who can move the ball to the left fullback.
Ajax having a keeper like Andre Onana and Marco Rose having a keeper like Yann Sommer adds another dimension to build-up in this shape. Ajax normally utilise Onana as an eleventh outfield player as the keeper pushing out of his box allows a centre-back to push up and act as a passing option in the next line, further exacerbating the numerical superiority. Creating space for one of the centre-backs to push up - especially the most central centre-back – will create better angles and situations for passes in between the lines, especially for the central four players who are dropping into space.
Positional Play with Four central zones
This attacking shape build on essential facets of positional play with five attackers by adding another central zone while the players in the four central zones have a responsibility of dropping deep to support the deep-lying midfielder by acting as passing options. Borussia Monchengladbach utilised this shape to great effect against FC Koln’s 4-1-4-1/4-4-2 medium block to progress play as Breel Embolo and Marcus Thuram acted as auxiliary eights in dropping deep to receive the ball while using their strength, directness and pace to connect play and progress in the opposition half. In the situation above, Embolo has dropped deep and Patrick Hermann instead of remaining in the half-space, is moving into Embolo’s zone to create a triangle for interchanges. The fullbacks are highly placed but are spaced closer to the wide centre-backs as they will maintain their positions to receive possession.
The front four will regularly drop deep and push forward to manipulate the opposition defensive block as in the situation above, the six is in possession as Alsane Plea has dropped. As Monchengladbach have a direct passing lane to Thuram in the left half-space, Plea will push higher dragging his marker with him while Thuram can drop into the space available. The deep-lying midfielder can then work a pass to the left centre-back who will have access to Thuram as the Frenchman can flick on for the fullback to drive into the lateral zone or hold the ball and look to turn to connect play in the centre. Koln are transitioning from a medium to low block to a higher press as they have moved to mark the six and close passing lanes with two of their central midfielders. However, Monchengladbach’s 3v1 overload with their centre-backs and variety of options in between the lines as well as Ismail Jakobs being caught deep and not pushing up to cut out the passing lane to the fullback.
Monchengladbach even opened the scoring utilising the 3-1-6 shape as the left centre-back took on a pass and played the ball to Ginter in the centre, Kramer who was positioned as a right centre-back dropped closer as a passing option. Ginter then pushed forward and gestured for Strobl in the six space to move a few inches to the left before working a pass to him as Strobl worked a one-two with the left centre-back which led to a midfielder pushing up to mark the defender, giving Strobl acres of space. Strobl then drove forward and spread a ball wide for fullback, Oscar Wendt to take a touch and cross for Hermann in the box as Embolo was making a late run outside him before the German controlled the ball and played in the Swiss International to curl a strike into the goal.
Monchengladbach have worked another 3-1-6 situation as Strobl has dropped in between the centre-backs, allowing Ginter to move into the right centre-back role as Lainer can push forward after he initially dropped deep. Ginter has access to Lainer, Hermann and Plea as the central four position themselves in pockets within the Koln defensive structure. Hermann is in the half-space in between the centre-back and fullback, Plea is in between the centre-backs moving to face the ball, Thuram is in between the ball-far centre-back and fullback while Embolo is driving into space in between the fullback and winger. In this situation, Ginter worked a pass to Hermann who dropped to receive the ball and drew his marker as the German laid off for Laimer who worked a pass through the open passing lane to Plea. Thuram also moved to the ball-near flank while Embolo moved inside the ball-far centre-back and fullback. Plea played the ball to Hermann who had a miscommunication with Thuram as he was making an angled run in behind instead of staying in position as the German passed straight to Jorge Mere.
Monchengladbach, work interchanges amongst the front three to create opportunities for triangular three-man interchanges or for a switch ball to the ball-far flank as a player dropping deep will trigger a player moving into the space he leaves so they can establish connections.
Ronald Koeman also utilised a 3-1-6 attacking formation for the Dutch National Team against Estonia. Frenkie de Jong moved into the left centre-back role next to Nathan Ake and Matthijs De Ligt, leaving Davy Propper in the six space as they had a front four of Luuk de Jong, Memphis Depay, Georginio Wijnaldum and Calvin Stengs. They worked rotations where each of the players would drop into space to receive the ball before laying it off and charging in behind while one of their teammates would drop deep in their place as a passing option for the three-chain.
Nagelsmann’s team changing to a 3-1-6 attacking shape is more natural as RB Leipzig can utilise more of a 3-1-5-1 build-up and attacking shape. His side also look for interchanges and shapes where they can get Timo Werner into space in the wide left area as well as in the deep central areas. The development of Patrik Schick has allowed Werner to move around as Schick holds the nine space while Nagelsmann relies on his wing-backs for width allowing the likes of Christopher Nkunku and Marcel Sabitzer to operate in the centre. In the situation above, they are playing against a 4-4-2 defensive shape as the opposition have pushed a midfielder forward to press the six-space allowing Sabitzer to move into space. The opposition are working a high-line and an offside trap as Schick is in an offside position, but Leipzig prefer to work passing sequences on the flank to release Werner in behind.
The central centre-back can work a pass to the left flank where Leipzig have the numerical superiority and space to work a rotation for a run in behind and a low cross. The key thing about Leipzig is not particularly the central areas in this situation but the wing-backs establishing width as they can work connections on one flank to switch to the weak side directly or by playing a pass back into the six space for the midfielder to turn and play the ball to the opposite flank. Nagelsmann has used different formations this season but his principles of play remain the same as he allows his centre-backs to drive the ball into the midfield line to attract pressure and play balls in between the lines. Leipzig are also one of the better sides in Europe at mastering the nuances of blind-sided movement in the final third. Their attackers are positioned closer to the defenders than the midfielders as if the centre-backs push forward and draw markers from midfield, they will be able to drop off and receive the ball in space.
The main issue with this formation is from a defensive aspect after ball-loss, Leipzig have an all-action attacker like Werner who is willing to drop back and regain possession after his side loses the ball. With injuries to Willi Orban and Ibahima Konate for most of the season, Nagelsmann has used fullbacks Lukas Klostermann and Marcel Halstenberg in wide centre-back roles as they are well-versed at winning 1v1s on an open flank while both have developed sense of angling perfectly timed challenges in recovery situations from opposition counters. To utilise this shape properly, a team has to have energetic and devoted attackers who are willing to quickly cover space in the case of ball-loss as well as efficient and calm ball-winners in the wide centre-back roles. The defensive midfielder has to maintain a situational awareness of when to leave his position and when to hold his position and drop back with the rest of his defence.
Conclusion
The improvement in training of centre-backs and defensive midfielders as ball-playing distributors facilitates an attacking formation like this as opposition sides have become more organised in their defending. The 3-1-6 if properly implemented allows the team in position to attack against 4-4-2 low blocks as it consistently gives them a numerical superiority in the deeper areas while denying the opposition opportunities to press the ball effectively due to the options in between the lines as the defenders are pinned back. It also builds on elements of stretching play and switching the ball in the final third as well as the nuances of blind-sided movements in the pockets. The dilemma will be seeing teams counter-pressing upon ball-loss to see if they can consistently, efficiently and effectively regain the ball in the higher areas.